Illinois

 
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The Laws That Should Protect Our Children

Current Criminal SOL in a nutshell

Removed in 2014, provided there is corroborating physical evidence, or a failure to report occurred.

720 ILCS 5/3-6 (j) (1) (“Extended limitations. The period within which a prosecution must be commenced under the provisions of Section 3-5 [720 ILCS 5/3-5] or other applicable statute is extended under the following conditions:…(j)(1)When the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or felony criminal sexual abuse may be commenced at any time when corroborating physical evidence is available or an individual who is required to report an alleged or suspected commission of any of these offenses under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act fails to do so.

APPLICABILITY: Removal effective Jan. 1, 2014.

o (The 2013 amendment by P.A. 98-379, effective January 1, 2014, added the (j)(1) through (j)(4) designations; added “may be commenced at any time when corroborating physical evidence is available or an individual who is required to report an alleged or suspected commission of any of these offenses under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act fails to do so” to the end of (j)(1); and added “In circumstances other than as described in paragraph (1) of this subsection (j), when the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or felony criminal sexual abuse” to the beginning of (j)(2).720 ILCS 5/3-6”)

o 720 ILCS 5/3-6 (j) (2) In circumstances other than as described in paragraph (1) of this subsection (j), when the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or felony criminal sexual abuse, or a prosecution for failure of a person who is required to report an alleged or suspected commission of any of these offenses under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act [325 ILCS 5/1 et seq.] may be commenced within 20 years after the child victim attains 18 years of age. (NOTE: this means SOL prior to Jan.1 2014, would have been +20 from majority as here for all of a previously unified j. see, 2013 amendments above.)

o 720 ILCS 5/3-6 (j) (3) When the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, a prosecution for misdemeanor criminal sexual abuse may be commenced within 10 years after the child victim attains 18 years of age.

o 720 ILCS 5/3-5(a) – (“Sec. 3-5. General Limitations. (a) A prosecution for:…child pornography under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1 [720 ILCS 5/11-20.1], aggravated child pornography under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1B [720 ILCS 5/11-20.1B (now repealed)], or (2) any offense involving sexual conduct or sexual penetration, as defined by Section 11-0.1 of this Code [720 ILCS 5/11-0.1] in which the DNA profile of the offender is obtained and entered into a DNA database within 10 years after the commission of the offense, may be commenced at any time. Clause (2) of this subsection (a) applies if either: (i) the victim reported the offense to law enforcement authorities within 3 years after the commission of the offense unless a longer period for reporting the offense to law enforcement authorities is provided in Section 3-6 [720 ILCS 5/3-6] or (ii) the victim is murdered during the course of the offense or within 2 years after the commission of the offense. ”)

Current Civil SOL in a nutshell

SOL: None. Some crimes eliminated prospectively as of January 2014; all others as of August 2017.

735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (f) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages based on childhood sexual abuse may be commenced at any time; provided, however, that the changes made by this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly [P.A. 98-276] apply to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly if the action would not have been time barred under any statute of limitations or statute of repose prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.”) Prospective/extension of open claims only. Revival unconstitutional in Illinois.

Civil Sol Tolling

DISCOVERY TOLLING Discovery, yes. Statute imposes liberal discovery rule. (CL version was narrow/unavailable to many—legislature overruled Courts’ interp. in 1993).

735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (a) (“the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.”) MAJORITY TOLLING

Majority, yes.

735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(d) “The limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run before the person abused attains the age of 18 years; and, if at the time the person abused attains the age of 18 years he or she is under other legal disability, the limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run until the removal of the disability.”

Age of Majority: 18. See, 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-1.
Age of Consent: 16. See, 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 11/6.

Age of Marriage with Parental Consent: 16 with parental or judicial consent.
Age of Marriage without Parental Consent: 18.
See, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/203.


Medical Neglect Statute

CIVIL MEDICAL NEGLECT STATUTE

A child shall not be considered neglected for the sole reason that the child’s parent or other person respon¬si¬ble for his or her welfare depends upon spiritual means through prayer alone for the treatment or cure of disease or remedial care as provided under Section 4 of this Act. Illinois Consolidated Statutes, Chapter 325 §5/3 (in definitions)

A child whose parent, guardian or custodian in good faith selects and depends upon spiritual means through prayer alone for the treatment or cure of disease or remedial care may be considered neglected or abused, but not for the sole reason that his parent, guardian or custodian accepts and practices such beliefs. Illinois Consolidated Statutes, Chapter 325 §5/4 (in reporting law)

CRIMINAL MEDICAL NEGLECT STATUTE

N/A


Religous Liberty Statute

Religious liberty statute that could put children at risk

Current Law: § 775 ILCS 35/1-99 (1998)

Enacted: July 1, 1998

§ 775 ILCS 35/1. SHORT TITLE Sec. 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

§ 775 ILCS 35/5. DEFINITIONS Sec. 5. Definitions. In this Act:”Demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.“Exercise of religion” means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.“Government” includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the State of Illinois or a political subdivision of the State, including a home rule unit. Read More § 775 ILCS 35/10. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES Sec. 10. Findings and purposes. (a) The General Assembly finds the following:

(1) The free exercise of religion is an inherent, fundamental, and inalienable right secured by Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois.

(2) Laws “neutral” toward religion, as well as laws intended to interfere with the exercise of religion, may burden the exercise of religion.

(3) Government should not substantially burden the exercise of religion without compelling justification.

(4) In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement under the First Amendment to the United States Constitutionthat government justify burdens on the exercise of religion imposed by laws neutral toward religion.

(5) In City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 65 LW 4612 (1997) the Supreme Court held that an Act passed by Congress to address the matter of burdens placed on the exercise of religion infringed on the legislative powers reserved to the states under the Constitution of the United States.

(6) The compelling interest test, as set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing governmental interests. (b) The purposes of this Act are as follows: (1) To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and to guarantee that a test of compelling governmental interest will be imposed on all State and local (including home rule unit) laws, ordinances, policies, procedures, practices, and governmental actions in all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened. (2) To provide a claim or defense to persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by government.

§ 775 ILCS 35/15. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED Sec. 15. Free exercise of religion protected. Government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

§ 775 ILCS 35/20. JUDICIAL RELIEF Sec. 20. Judicial relief. If a person’s exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of this Act, that person may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government. A party who prevails in an action to enforce this Act against a government is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in maintaining the claim or defense.

§ 775 ILCS 35/25. APPLICATION OF ACT; HOME RULE POWERS Sec. 25. Application of Act; home rule powers. (a) This Act applies to all State and local (including home rule unit) laws, ordinances, policies, procedures, practices, and governmental actions and their implementation, whether statutory or otherwise and whether adopted before or after the effective date of this Act. (b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize a government to burden any religious belief. (c) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address any of the following: (i) that portion of the First Amendment of the United States Constitutionprohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion, (ii) the second sentence of Article I, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution, or (iii) Article X, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution.Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the 3 constitutional provisions described in items (i), (ii), and (iii) of this subsection, does not constitute a violation of this Act. In this subsection, “granting”, used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions. (d) The corporate authorities of a municipality or other unit of local government may enact ordinances, standards, rules, or regulations that protect the free exercise of religion in a manner or to an extent equal to or greater than the protection provided in this Act. If an ordinance, standard, rule, or regulation enacted under the authority of this Section or under the authority of a unit of local government’s home rule powers prohibits, restricts, narrows, or burdens a person’s exercise of religion or permits the prohibition, restriction, narrowing, or burdening of a person’s exercise of religion, that ordinance, standard, rule, or regulation is void and unenforceable as to that person if it (i) is not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is not the least restrictive means of furthering that governmental interest. This subsection is a limitation under subsection (i) of Section 6 of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution on the concurrent exercise by home rule units of powers and functions exercised by the State.

§ 775 ILCS 35/30. O’HARE MODERNIZATION AND SOUTH SUBURBAN AIRPORT Sec. 30. O’Hare Modernization and South Suburban Airport. Nothing in this Act limits the authority of the City of Chicago to exercise its powers under the O’Hare Modernization Act [60 ILCS 65/1 et seq.], or the Department of Transportation to exercise its powers under the Public-Private Agreements for the South Suburban Airport Act [620 ILCS 75/2-1 et seq.], for the purposes of relocation of cemeteries or the graves located therein.

§ 775 ILCS 35/99. EFFECTIVE DATE This Act takes effect on July 1, 1998.